# NEG

### Res Good

#### Debates about transatlantic relations are good

**Franke and Hofferberth 21** (Ulrich Franke and Matthias Hofferberth, \*PhD in political science, \*\*PhD, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science and Geography. 2021 ISA Annual Convention, "From Transatlantic Relations to World Order: Reconstructing Beliefs as Rules for Action", 4/6/2021, http://colfa.utsa.edu/polisci-geography/docs/Franke\_\_Hofferberth\_ISA\_2021\_final.pdf, accessed on 7/21/2022)//gideon

More specifically, past decades have produced a global power shift away from transatlantic relations as the product of Western, state-driven foreign policy in two respects. As to the first, whether or not one believes the assertion of the dissolution of the Soviet Union provided a unipolar moment for the United States in the early 1990s (Mearsheimer 2019, Ikenberry 2014), undoubtedly the most significant constituent and a sine qua non of any transatlantic relations, new powers have emerged in the meantime and affect these relations significantly. On a global level, in view of the massive increase in military spending, the People’s Republic of China is the first to be mentioned, but on a regional level, Russia, India, Brazil, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and, certainly in a different fashion but nevertheless relevant, the European Union, another important constituent part of the so-called West, have all expressed different perspectives on and visions of world order recently (Acharya 2017). Collectively, global power shifts in favor of non-Western states can certainly be considered a consensus within International Relations (IR). The same holds for the assumption that this is accompanied by a – relative – loss of importance of the West, specifically in light of President Trump’s disregard for multilateralism and the values of the liberal order as such. Second, power on the international scene understood as the capacity to have an impact on people’s lives whether they want it or not, is also shifted to and increasingly exerted by so-called non-state actors and within intergovernmental organizations (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010). This includes advocacy groups claiming moral high grounds in global governance as well as multinational corporations, particularly to but not exclusively from the technology sector (Alphabet/Google, Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Microsoft to name but a few). - 3 - Against this backdrop of a double power shift away from the West and away from states, **we do** not believe that the declining **relative** relevance oftransatlantic relations **as the internal relationship of the West** diminishes its relevance as an object of IR research. Rather, assuming **discursive importance** as a reference object and as political practice, we assume actors in and of **transatlantic** **relations** respond to these challenges and thereby either reproduce or develop new aspects of said relations. For one thing, we do not assume a zero-sum approach to power. Under the condition of an understanding of power as the enforcement of rules, for instance, the relative loss of power of a political entity can go hand-in-hand with the entity striving to enforce a greater number of rules in absolute terms than before. What these rules-as-visions are about, then, remains important – regardless of the fact that others also (increasingly) have power and enforce (an even more growing number of) rules. Moreover, it can be observed that in case of positional differences between the governments of the U.S. on the one hand and (some) European states on the other hand, major **crises** and the end of transatlantic relations are always **proclaimed** very quickly (and alarmistically) – **by politicians, journalists, but also by IR scholars**. Crisis and catharsis, at least, seem to be recurrent narratives of transatlantic relations, often originating unreflectively within a hybrid discourse of practitioners and think tanks, often derived from the notion that a new U.S. president approaches transatlantic relations in a different light.1 The inherent presentism of think tank thinking and political practice aside, transatlantic relations are thus still a much-noticed object of public debate and consideration as they remain an issue quite **affectively occupied and connected to normative assumptions, in the West as well as beyond**. To **examine transatlantic relations** thus also seems promising from this point of view.

#### NATO is good

Coker 09

(Christopher Coker is Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science, 3-27-2009, "Post-modern NATO," Rusi, <https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/post-modern-nato/>, DOA July 21, 2022)

NATO has expanded beyond its initial notion of an Atlantic community. No longer is it delineated by the Iron Curtain, and the Alliance has resisted calls to define itself against Islamic fundamentalism. NATO still needs a new self-understanding, key to which will be a clearer sense of its relationship with Russia. The Argentinean writer Jorge Luis Borges once remarked that we are all confronted by the ‘modesty of history’. In plying their trade historians and political scientists try to identify historic turning points and to date them precisely, but history is more modest. Its essential dates remain secret for a long time. I cite Borges because one of the decisive dates he chose, and one which moved him profoundly (or so he tells us), was the liberation of Paris in August 1944. For what he saw at the time was the conception of something new – a western community or coalition that having triumphed over fascism would stand firm against communism as well. Had Borges been alive today what dates would he have chosen for the transformation of that community in its institutional form, the Atlantic Alliance? Since the end of the Cold War NATO has changed profoundly. If we seek to date that change perhaps we should look to the Partnership for Peace initiative of 1994; or the NATO-Russia Founding Act signed three years later which placed the relationship between the West and its old protagonist on a contractual footing; or the invitation at Madrid in 1999 to three East European countries to begin the process of enlargement. One could choose all or any of these as keystones in NATO’s path to becoming a post-modern alliance. Post western alliance To claim that NATO has become a post-western alliance may strike one as at best ironic, at worst plainly perverse. At the Washington Conference in 1949 one of the participants Paul Henri Spaak called it ‘an act of faith in the destiny of western civilization’. It is worth remembering, in fact, that the alliance was meant to be more than a military alliance. Its founding fathers hoped to forge an Atlantic Community as Christian Herter, John Foster Dulles’ successor at the State Department called it. At the end of the 1950s, in fact, the United States fought to give the alliance a federal framework – a permanent council elected by the NATO Council of Ministers; a political general staff or steering committee, or Atlantic Commission. In the end, an Atlantic Community was not forged. Instead, the United States and Europe began drifting apart. As Walter Hallstein, the President of the European Commission remarked in 1961, the Europeans were no longer interested in the Alliance as a ‘collective political personality’; they were interested only in a loose association based on two separate pillars – Europe and the United States. Yet until the very end of the Cold War, the Alliance’s ‘Western’ credentials were constantly reaffirmed: in the Atlantic Declaration of 1974 and most recently the Transatlantic Declaration of 1990. Even after the collapse of communism and long before 9/11 there was still a hope that NATO would remain a western club, by defining itself against another universal enemy: Islam. In the attack by Islamic fundamentalists on western culture many observers seemed to be confirmed in their conviction that the worlds of secularism and Islam were as fundamentally incompatible as those of capitalism and communism. In Islamic fundamentalism many commentators saw another existential threat to western civilization. In the event, the attempt in February 1995 by the NATO Secretary-General, Willie Claes, to reaffirm the alliance on that basis met with little or no support. History has now moved on. Willie Claes’ ‘Huntingdonian’ predilection for seeing it in cultural terms was not wrong in itself, but the clash of civilizations thesis is based on a very modern definition of civilization. The idea of civilization which the West fought so hard to impose on its enemies can no longer be sustained. It now refers to a distinctive mode of existence in the global age, not an ideal order of human society. It is no longer possible to insist that the peoples of the world are living through a stage in a unitary scale of progress whose apex is western civilization. Indeed, long before the Cold War had run its course this had been conceded by no less a figure than Raymond Aron. Aron shared none of his own countrymen’s fears of American hegemony or their aversion to Anglo-Saxon universalism. He would be among the first to applaud his country’s return to NATO’s integrated military command. But he recognized that if civilization itself was to be defended in the future against fundamentalist forces that challenged everything that made life ‘civil’ the West would have to be less exclusive in its definition. ‘The present phase of civilization is coming to an end’, he wrote in the 1960’s, ‘and for good or ill humanity is embarking on a new phase,’ that of forging a single world civilization for the first time, one truly universal in its appeal. What Aron recognized was that every culture - to take one critical example, human rights - must realize values in its own way. He recognized that the whole debate on human rights had been bedeviled for far too long by western ideas. There is no global consensus on what constitutes those rights but NATO is trying to demarcate what President Bush called ‘the non-negotiable demands of human freedom’. In 1996 in a speech in Aachen Vaclav Havel defined what the term ‘civilization’ meant in the post-modern era. Like Aron he talked of a new West, a wider one, though still distinguished by ‘a metaphysically anchored sense of responsibility’. The West’s task, he argued, should be to rededicate itself to a different project – to admit that there are values which transcend the West itself; to find what it has in common with other cultures; ‘to join forces with them in search for the common moral minimum necessary to guide us’. Let me highlight two key phrases from that speech. NATO must have a normative purpose in the twenty-first century, or what Havel calls ‘a metaphysically anchored sense of responsibility’. But in a post-modern age it cannot have a maximalist one: the desire to impose a western definition of civilized norms. The ‘moral minimum’ is what it must aim for. This is not a minimalist objective, however, for it requires the alliance to intervene for the first time on behalf of those who are not even members. It did this in Kosovo in 1999, the alliance’s first war. It is attempting to do this in Afghanistan today, in its second military venture. Post Atlantic Alliance To call NATO a post-Atlantic Alliance may appear equally perverse given its decision to forge a Euro-Atlantic Partnership and a Euro-Atlantic Council but both of these were conjured into existence for a reason. i.e. ‘Atlanticism’ as it was traditionally understood is no longer sustainable. For most of its history, of course, NATO was an Atlanticism institution whose founding document was not the Washington Treaty of 1949 but the Atlantic Charter of 1941 to which the United States put its name four months before it entered the Second World War. The Charter was not only a statement of principle signed by Britain and the United States. The British signed it on behalf of all but one of the European governments in exile in London. The exception, France, only signed in December 1944 – three months after its liberation (so Borges, perhaps, was right after all, to date the conception of the Atlantic Alliance – as opposed to its birth – to the liberation of Paris). In the words of André Malraux, the Old and New Worlds had been divided by the Atlantic, an ocean which had provided a passage for those fleeing political and economic oppression in Europe. In the 1940s the immigration largely stopped. The Atlantic became a bridge, not a barrier. In that sense, the Old World was conjoined with the New. The Atlantic Alliance was lauded precisely for that reason. It offered, wrote the contemporary historian Hans Kohn, a vehicle through which ‘the nations on the two shores of the Atlantic’ had begun to realise their communality for the first time. Although they had not shared a common past they would, at least, share a common destiny. Atlanticism grew naturally out of the politics and sympathies forged in two World Wars. It was consistent with the very ‘modern’ belief that countries were not states so much as contracts with history. What was the United States, asked the poet William Carlos Williams, but ‘the inspired invention of European thought’. In the political sphere Atlanticism was a also a corner stone of Britain’s supposed ‘special relationship’ with the United States. But it was also vitally important in helping the United States understand itself. For the American elite’s idea of national consensus at the time was also in step with the popular response to assimilation. Indeed, the East and Central Europeans who began arriving after 1910 only to find themselves discriminated against as ‘non-whites’ were the first to benefit from Atlanticism. For at its core was the belief in the force of equality. That ideology, in turn, became a mainstay of the government’s own effort of mobilisation. It facilitated its attempt to unite the nation behind the rhetoric of the Cold War. It marked the historic moment when the ‘ghetto-whites’: the Slovaks, Poles and Ruthenians felt fully accepted as Americans. It was all the more ironic, therefore, that the Atlanticism which helped end social divisiveness within the US and unite the United States should have divided western and eastern Europe. In closing the gap between the old and new worlds, Atlanticism widened the gap between the two in the western imagination. The decision forty years later to enlarge NATO was important for that reason. It spelt the end of what the historian Norman Davies calls ‘the Allied version of history’ – the belief in a unique, secular brand of western civilisation in which the Atlantic Alliance was presented as the pinnacle of human progress with the Atlantic Charter as its key. The Allied version of history was pernicious precisely because it drew an imaginary line behind which the West deemed itself to be more progressive, advanced and civilised. The Hungarian writer Istvan Bibo was probably right to suspect in 1946 - even before the Iron Curtain was drawn across the continent - that many westerners were not unhappy to see Eastern Europe policed by a great power, in part because they suspected its people of ‘an innate barbarism’. It is now clear, of course, that many fault lines have shaped the history of Europe. Some run north/south and divide the members of ‘old Europe’. The lukewarm support for the Kosovo war in the south, and 85 per cent support ratings in the Nordic world highlighted the differences. It is symbolically fitting that NATO should have become the instrument by which Eastern and Western Europe (and the United States, with its large and politically important East European minorities) have rediscovered each other. It is morally important that the Czech Republic has embraced what Havel once described as “the poetic charm” of NATO membership. The phrase reminds me of a passage in the novel Life is Elsewhere by his fellow countryman, Milan Kundera. Referring to the coup of 1948 which his generation welcomed as a new dawn, Kundera reflects that ‘the wall behind which people were imprisoned was made of verse’. The new poetics of history is no longer communism but European integration, and instead of imprisoning people behind a conceptual wall, it offers them a wider horizon. Is the process of NATO expansion complete? Should the Alliance admit Georgia and Ukraine? Historically and culturally neither have been ‘European’ – they have always been on the margins (if that) of the western imagination. The same cannot be said of Russia. Alliance without borders Throughout the Cold War NATO and the Warsaw Pact found themselves locked into a position of strategic inertia. History in the twentieth century, wrote the philosopher Walter Benjamin, was a permanent state of emergency. And like all such states it demanded a suspension of action, (though not, of course, belief). The very concept of movement, Benjamin added, had become associated with the notion of catastrophe – ‘the fact that things move on is the catastrophe’ he warned. History since then has become the permanent revision of what has been achieved, and this is no less true in the security field than every other. In today’s Europe ‘the structure of peace’ is no longer based on two opposing military blocs deterring each other from breaking the peace. Today’s Europe is characterized by change: the transformation of the security environment is the principal theme of politics and security studies. The old system was built on the principle of power restraining power. Great emphasis was based on drawing lines in the sand. Today the emphasis is on inter-penetration and transparency. The British diplomat Robert Cooper describes its chief characteristics : the break down the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs the growth of mutual interference in traditional domestic affairs and mutual surveillance. Intrusive verification which is at the heart of the news arms control regime is a key element of a global order in which state sovereignty is no longer considered to be absolute. the rejection of force for resolving disputes, and the codification of rules of behavior the growing irrelevance of borders the extent to which security is based on transparency, mutual openness, interdependence and mutual vulnerability One of NATO’s twenty-first century missions is to help construct a community in which common identities are constituted by normative practices other than national sovereignty; and in which people find themselves involved in the life of the region as well as their own country. NATO shares that task with other institutions, especially the OSCE which is also trying to forge a common security perspective or ‘single cognitive space’. Peace in Europe is now maintained by the institutional synergy of several security organizations of which NATO is one. The OSCE is another. If anything, the Russians take the OSCE more seriously than most western countries, or, at least, claim to. Some time ago Vladimir Lukin, the chairman of the Duma International Affairs Committee, suggested that the second phase of NATO enlargement should include all the participating members of the OSCE (including Russia), and that thereafter, the organization should dissolve itself and become the OSCE’s military arm. This is unlikely to happen but the West needs to find some more permanent basis for its relationship with Russia. For synergy is a process not a product. Each institution increases the effectiveness of the other; it is the relationship between them which enhances each. Since 1991 we have seen the emergence of the Russia-NATO Council. There was also talk of a joint NATO-Russia brigade. The alliance has put much of its history behind it; it has embraced globalization with some real success; it has fought one war and finds itself involved in another. But for good or ill, the relationship with Russia is still crucial to the new alliance NATO is in the process of becoming. Until it is resolved we will not know what the alliance will finally become.

### TVA

#### Plan: The United States Federal Government should substantially increase security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the area of cybersecurity by imposing regulations on data extraction

#### Regulation is key to solve the consequences of surveillance capitalism – only working with both tech and regulations can solve

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Turning now to what could be done, one goal should be to limit the damage done by the surveillance capitalism business model, while still retaining key benefits of the services it provides. But if possible, we would like to move beyond damage control and support positive visions of how IT can better support people and communities. Crafting and deploying such solutions is an exceedingly difficult problem. Even though this business model has only recently come into being, the corporations practicing it have become dominant, and the technologies and services are threaded throughout our lives, communities, and economies. Regulation will be a key element of a response. However, regulation should not simply be a reaction to technology and an attempt to curb its worst excesses: technology should not be taken as a fixed, external force that will inevitably follow a particular path. Nor is surveillance capitalism at its root a technological problem amenable to a purely technological fix. Instead, regulation and technology should be co-designed and co-evolved. Citizens and civil society organizations will play key roles as well, by pushing for more effective regulation and supporting technologies, by helping to foster alternative models for providing needed services, and by adopting new social practice.

Regulation and law

Regulation and law form key elements of possible solutions. We suggest four principal goals for regulation: protecting privacy, erecting barriers to behavior manipulation, protecting free speech and civic participation, and (probably most controversially) undermining the economic basis of the surveillance capitalism business model so that alternatives can take root and flourish. Having such alternatives should lessen the dependence on these IT companies, while still having a way that people and society can have access to useful IT services – and beyond this, support positive visions of the role of IT in communities and society.

#### Informed consent and the minimum data approach protect our personal information while browsing – this limits the damage of surveillance capitalism

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Another area of legislative activity is do-not-track legislation. The general goal of these bills is to allow users to decide whether or not they are willing to be tracked by third-party websites while browsing websites and potentially while using other internet-based services.

True informed consent

One reaction to privacy concerns is to implement much stronger requirements for informed consent, of which the GDPR is one important example. Improving information and consent is certainly a good thing, but in our view is inadequate. Being deluged with pages and pages of consent agreements about what information is being gathered about you isn't that useful, and if the alternatives are to check the ‘agree’ box, or to be left out of a great deal of social and political interaction, this is not a particularly meaningful choice. However, stronger implementations of consent are possible.

As a thought experiment, suppose that surveillance capitalist corporations were required to operate under the same conditions that govern research involving human subjects. For example, in response to past abuses, the US government adopted the Belmont Report (1978), which laid out principles for human subjects research. It requires true informed consent, which must be voluntary and ongoing. That implies that the consent form must be straightforward and comprehensible – so no 30 page legal monstrosity as with typical corporate privacy statements – and the subject must be able to withdraw from the experiment at any time. Further, only data needed to conduct the study should be gathered, and must be deleted once the study is over and analysis is complete. The data must also be held confidential and protected – it would be forbidden, for example, to hand it over to another research group without consent.

If similar requirements were placed on surveillance capitalist firms, they would require true informed consent, the ability to withdraw ones data at any time, and would not allow the data to be shared without permission with a third party. People should be able to challenge inaccurate information and have it removed. Note that today people do not even have access to a transparent overview of how their private data is trapped, transferred, sold and aggregated. Therefore, as a prerequisite, these data pathways need to be visible for the user and the public regulators.

Further, in analogy with the human research requirements, only the data needed to provide the service in question could be gathered, but not the cloud of additional data that is gathered and retained as at present. In other words, what we advocate includes (but is not limited to) the concept of ‘minimum data.’ These corporations should not be allowed to collect data that is not necessary to provide their service. However, minimum data alone could still leave loopholes for service providers, e.g., they could claim all personal data collected is necessary for AI-powered algorithms to provide a service optimized to personal needs. Therefore, true informed consent in analogy with human research requirements exceeds the minimum data approach. Finally, the requirements should be much stronger for children and vulnerable populations (e.g., prisoners). For example, in many cases the companies should simply not be allowed to accumulate information on children.

#### The plan is key to interoperability – it’s the only way to reduce the user’s dependence on monopoly organizations

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Adversarial interoperability

The current IT landscape is dominated by a very small number of companies in monopoly positions. Breaking up monopolies would be a useful step in ensuring that users are not too dependent on a single service provider. However, in our view, simply splitting Facebook, for example, into six mini-Facebooks, each with the same surveillance capitalism business model, would not be a particularly effective approach. Better would be to break up companies along functional lines and to regulate the exchange of information among these now-third-party entities. For instance, Facebook could be required to divest from the essentially unrelated parts of its business, including Facebook Messenger, WhatsApp, and Instagram. However, just doing that, each sub-company could hold a monopoly in its niche, so a comprehensive approach must go further. And given the network effect and the resulting centralization mentioned above, which are prevalent for Internet platforms, reverting to a monopoly situation is the most likely outcome without additional regulation and oversight.

Interoperability is one key to reducing the user's dependence on the corporation or organization providing the service, as well as increasing the ability of small competitors to improve upon single features or to serve specialized markets. In his recent book How to Destroy Surveillance Capitalism, Doctorow (2020) uses the term ‘adversarial interoperability’ (or ‘competitive compatibility’ (Doctorow, 2021)), capturing that interoperability cannot be expected to be implemented voluntarily by for-profit companies if doing so might reduce their profits. But having such interoperability would make it easier for for-profit competitors to enter the market, as well as nonprofit or public entities, and therefore should be legally enforced. Doctorow (2020) argues:

‘If our concern is how corporations are foreclosing on our ability to make up our own minds and determine our own futures, the impact of dominance far exceeds the impact of manipulation and should be central to our analysis and any remedies we seek.’

His position that enforcing antitrust legislation in this domain is an important one, although we would add that protecting against surveillance and manipulation is equally important.

Antitrust law may provide a suitable means for motivating requirements for adversarial interoperability. We are not experts in the law, but we can say that it will probably not be enough to apply existing antitrust law consistently to the case of IT services; new regulations will also have to be added. For example, antitrust law as currently interpreted aims at enforcing fair prices for customers. This does not cover the case of free applications, in other words, the users who should be protected are not even the customers in this case.

#### The organizations are supported by advertising – profit will still be available

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For-profit corporations

One option is for-profit corporations. We earlier suggested that the shift from context specific to targeted advertising marks the location of a suitable line to draw and challenge surveillance capitalism by prohibiting advertising based on personal profiling. However, for-profit corporations could continue to offer these services, supported by advertising, including context-specific advertising, just without personal profiling. Another funding option is fee-for-service. These options are thus still very much capitalism, just not surveillance capitalism.

There are existing corporations that use these models. Two systems to be noted in particular are Brave2 and DuckDuckGo3. Brave is an open-source browser that (the company says) blocks ads and trackers, in both mobile and desktop versions. The DuckDuckGo search engine, according to the company, does not collect or share personal information. Its business model is still based on advertising (and also affiliate marketing).

Another option is to nudge the market by having institutions such as libraries, universities, and others buy ad-free, no tracking versions of services for their patrons/students, either from new companies, or from existing large IT corporations if they are willing to unbundle their services to support this. (Note that it would be essential to monitor the corporations carefully to ensure they are not tracking these users (Farivar, 2016; Peterson, 2015).)

### Advocacy Fails

#### Companies backlash by lobbying

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Since these measures directly attack the power position of IT companies, countermeasures are to be expected, including extensive lobbying and media campaigns, as well as the continuing instrumentalization of intellectual property laws. For example, even if an IT service was involved in the creation of content, it should not be granted any intellectual property rights to it. Otherwise, Facebook, for example, could use intellectual property law to prevent users from scraping their own content and uploading it onto competing systems. The same is true for cloud computing providers. Therefore, IP restrictions are quite consequential and must be considered in responding to the expected countermeasures. However, intellectual property is just one way in which law is used to create abstract forms of capital. In her recent book The Code of Capital, Pistor (2020) shows how the law selectively codes claims and ideas into capital. All of these forms need to be considered as expected legal countermeasures big companies will apply against regulation. Furthermore, investigations and whistleblowers will be necessary for identifying misconduct. As a consequence, there should be compensation paid, and since one of the aggrieved parties is society as a whole, it is easily justifiable to channel this compensation into the development of alternatives, as one source for funding for them.